

THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

No. 3,104 60th Year


POSTAGE:
INLAND & ABROAD 2½d

FRIDAY AUGUST 25 1961

PUBLISHED WEEKLY. ENTERED
MATTER. PRICE 25c.; SUBS.
YEARLY. 25, EAST 54TH STREET.

CONTENTS

Leading Article:	PAGE
Art and Literature ..	565
Front:	
Ships and Deep Friendships ..	557
Middle:	
A Master of Experience ..	564
Poem:	
John Press: <i>Design</i> ..	567
Archaeology	569
Art and Architecture:	
<i>The Artist and the Book, 1860-1960,</i> <i>in Western Europe and the United</i> <i>States</i> ..	560
O. Bihalji-Merin: <i>Modern Primitives</i> ..	560
F. Busse: <i>Venice</i> ..	560
J. Leymarie: <i>Braque</i> ..	560
J. Marcadé: <i>Roma Amor</i> ..	569
R. Nacenta: <i>School of Paris</i> ..	560
Biography and Memoirs:	
D. Bates: <i>The Shell at my Ear</i> ..	563
D. Black: <i>The Foot of the Rainbow</i> ..	563
Critch! ..	563
B. Fergusson: <i>Wavell</i> ..	563
W. Gérin: <i>The Young Fanny</i> <i>Burney</i> ..	567
S. Jameson: <i>The Journal of Mary</i> <i>Hervey Russell</i> ..	563
M. Mehdevi: <i>Something Human</i> ..	563
P. van Paassen: <i>A Crown of Fire</i> ..	562
H. Pearson: <i>The Pilgrim Daughters</i> ..	563
<i>The Percy Letters. Vol. VI</i> ..	563
<i>Studies on Voltaire and the</i> <i>Eighteenth Century</i> ..	566
Fiction	561
History:	
D. M. Clark: <i>The Rise of the</i> <i>British Treasury</i> ..	570
M. C. Hill: <i>The King's Messengers</i> ..	570
L. Jacob: <i>Hébert</i> ..	562
<i>The Papers of Benjamin Franklin</i> ..	562
G. Pernoud and S. Flaissier: <i>The</i> <i>French Revolution</i> ..	562
<i>The Prester John of the Indies</i> ..	562
R. L. Storey: <i>Thomas Langley and</i> <i>the Bishopric of Durham</i> ..	570
Literature and Literary Criticism:	
M. Bowen: <i>The Long Encounter</i> ..	567
B. I. Granger: <i>Political Satire in the</i> <i>American Revolution</i> ..	566
P. A. Spalding: <i>In the Margin</i> ..	567
A. Tagore: <i>Reader</i> ..	569
F. J. Temple: <i>D. H. Lawrence</i> ..	566



An illustration by Picasso for the Skira (1931) edition of Ovid's *Les Métamorphoses*; reproduced from *The Artist and the Book 1860-1960*, which is reviewed on page 560.

THE MILITARY INTELLECTUALS

THE MILITARY ANALYST, as a distinct civilian profession, now seems to be here to stay. When a few years ago in America a number of academics left their universities to advise the administration from Great George Street and Great Turnstile can be heard mingling in rare unison, thanking God that there are not.

The British have shown, indeed, an apathetic hostility to any development of this sort. It lies partly in a contribution to the general debate. Mr. Henry Kissinger is generally credited with the pioneer thinking about limitations on war; Mr. Albert Wohlstetter, with the first serious critique of the doctrine of the Balance of Terror; Mr. Thomas Schelling,

Philosophy	568
Poetry :	
<i>The Complete Poems of Cavafy</i> ..	566
G. Hough : <i>Legends and Pastorals</i> ..	567
A. Marnau : <i>Räuber-Requiem</i> ..	566
J. Maschfield : <i>The Bluebells and Other Verse</i>	564
Psychology :	
M. Raclot, C. Baudouin and Others : <i>Problems in Psychoanalysis</i> ..	569
Religion and Theology	568
Science	569
World Affairs :	
F. Gabrieli : <i>The Arab Revival</i> ..	559
C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean : <i>The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age</i>	557
H. Kahn : <i>On Thermo-nuclear War</i> ..	557
G. F. Kennan : <i>Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin</i> ..	559
R. Strausz-Hupé and Others : <i>A Forward Strategy for America</i> ..	557
Books Received	570, 571
Notes on Foreign Sales	572



ST MARTIN'S LIBRARY

A series of unabridged, well-produced paperbacks ranging from famous fiction and plays to works of literature and religion. The following titles are the first in the 'new look' *St. Martin's Library*, which all have attractive new illustrated jackets

MARGARET MITCHELL
GONE WITH THE WIND
(1 Vol. Over 1,000 pages) 7s 6d

To be published August 31st

RUDYARD KIPLING
THE JUNGLE BOOK 3s
PUCK OF POOK'S HILL 4s
KIM 5s

WILLIAM TEMPLE
READINGS IN ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL
(First and Second Series) 6s

OWEN WISTER
THE VIRGINIAN 6s

MACMILLAN

or the services on political or technical problems connected with defence policy, they expected to return to their campuses once the assignment was over; much as the British dons who helped to direct our economy, our weapons development and our intelligence services during the last war reattached themselves to their professional studies with a redoubled determination which even a third, and nuclear, world war seems unlikely to shake. But the assignment is not over. There is no reason to suppose that it ever will be. The problem of security in the nuclear age is likely to demand ever more attention from experts in law, history, international relations and the social and natural sciences; and in the United States a field of study has emerged as independent and as reputable as the study of economics.

Most major universities house or sponsor institutes for the study of national or international security problems. Others are financed by the Government or the services, chief among them Rand Corporation—a body whose glamorous Californian setting and elaborate security precautions would gladden the heart of Mr. Ian Fleming. From this and other seminars there issues a stream of distinguished consultants—Kahn, Wohlstetter, Brodie, Hitch, Kissinger, Bowie, Schelling—who move freely through the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department, rather as the Jesuits through the courts of Madrid and Vienna, three centuries ago, when we in Europe were having our own little local difficulties. There are no comparable institutions in this country, and voices

HERMAN KAHN: *On Thermo-nuclear War*. 651pp. Princeton University Press. London: Oxford University Press. £2 15s.

CHARLES J. HITCH and ROLAND N. MCKEAN: *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. 422pp. Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 45s.

ROBERT STRAUZ-HUPÉ and OTHERS: *A Forward Strategy for America*. 451pp. New York: Harper Brothers. London: Hamish Hamilton. 42s.

ment of this sort. It lies partly in a natural enough reluctance to think very seriously about so disagreeable a question as war in the nuclear age. It lies partly also in academic conservatism; but its main root is our national devotion to an empirical tradition which, admirable as it is in many respects, has certain obvious drawbacks. Our ideal is still the man of the world, the man of affairs, many-sided, experienced, wise. So it should be. The skills of the scholar and the academic analyst are no substitute for the flair of the experienced commander or statesman, any more than those of the academic economist can displace that of the experienced banker or businessman. Yet the problems of national security, like those of the national economy, have become so staggeringly complex that they can no longer be settled simply by massive commonsense.

The manner in which weapons-systems are likely to develop; the counters which may be found to them; the burden which they are likely to impose on the national economy; the way in which their possession will affect international relations or their use the nature of war; the technical problems of their control or abolition; all these are problems far beyond the scope of the Joint Planning Staff study or the Civil Service brief. The military analyst who examines them may be hampered by lack of practical experience of military affairs, as the economic analyst may be hampered by lack of practical experience in the City. The statesman who receives his advice will bear that drawback in mind, but he will be unwise if, on those grounds, he discards it altogether. He can afford to neglect neither the inductive reasoning of experience nor the deductive reasoning of intellectual analysis. In the field of national security, as in every other, they complement each other.

The American military intellectuals confer so often and achieve so constant and fruitful a meeting of minds that it is sometimes difficult to attribute to each his own peculiar

of Terror; Mr. Thomas Schelling, with the doctrine of silent bargaining over arms control. But these and other contributions have now been so generally taken up and assimilated that their origin becomes lost or blurred. One voice, however, rises loud and distinct above the general symposium—that of Mr. Herman Kahn of Rand Corporation, whose learned, ill-organized and immensely long study, *On Thermo-nuclear War*, is the most sensational and provocative work which the military analysts have yet produced for the general public.

It is sensational because it is the first published study to examine seriously the question how a nuclear war would be conducted; provocative, because Mr. Kahn employs techniques of mathematical analysis which, the farther he takes them, the farther they take him from the real world. He oscillates infuriatingly between rigorous analysis, Swiftian irony (his "Domesday Machine" is a Modest Proposal of which the great Dean would have been justly proud), serious recommendations and earnest, hopeless exhortations. The result is a major, if baroque, work of military thought; and it is worth spending a little time examining it, to gain some idea of the way in which military analysts go about their business.

Mr. Kahn's starting-point is an attack on the belief "that thermo-nuclear war would eventuate in mutual annihilation as the result of almost any plausible turn of military events"; or, as it is sometimes expressed in this country, if the deterrent is used it will have failed. We must look beyond the first nuclear exchange, he argues, for reasons not only of prudent humanity but of strategy and of effective deterrence as well. Careful preparations now might ensure that the United States suffered, in a nuclear exchange, a maximum of twenty million deaths; lack of them might put the death-roll up to eighty million. "Somehow", Mr. Kahn observes ruefully, "the impression is left that the planner said that there

"Statesman" with a good theory will look better than one with a bad one, or one who has to improve a theory (into which to fit his special knowledge) during the crisis

would be only twenty million dead. To him is often attributed the idea that this will be a tolerable . . . state!"

Such is certainly not Mr. Kahn's view. He wants to save sixty million lives; and he is optimistic about the chances of doing so. "Objective studies indicate", he claims,

that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the post-war world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants.

As for the genetic consequences of radiation, the number of seriously defective children born might rise to five per cent of the total births from the existing ratio of four per cent; but

it might well turn out that U.S. decision-makers would be willing, among other things, to accept the high risk of an additional one per cent of our children being deformed if that meant not giving up Europe to Soviet Russia.

It might indeed; but the decision-makers are not likely to thank Mr. Kahn for presenting the nature of their problem in quite such unequivocal terms. *Kahn ignores relations between info, calculation, & responsibility.*

Mr. Kahn bases his calculations on the assumption that the enemy would strike first. If his blow were directed, as logically it should be, not against American cities but against airfields, ports, command-posts and missile sites, he might inflict no more than two million casualties but still cripple

the American capacity to retaliate. If he threatened to continue with his attacks, causing a further x million casualties, would it be sane for the United States to retaliate at all?

A nation such as the United States might be willing to fight to the last man, but there are almost no circumstances in which it should be willing to fight to the last woman and child.

It might nevertheless try blindly to punish the enemy by retaliating against his cities; or it might try to force a stalemate, concentrating its response against enemy weapons and keeping his cities as "hostages" with which to negotiate a compromise peace. In any case, argues Mr. Kahn,

we need to have available a series of options during the very first minutes of the war in order to be able to react safely and surely to varying kinds of warnings and varying kinds of provocations;

and such options will be available only if the United States takes the necessary measures now.

Chief among those measures Mr. Kahn lists a major civil defence programme, since all American strategy must be based on a capacity to absorb a Russian first strike. How high a price, he asks, in another of his uncomfortably phrased questions, is the United States prepared to pay to punish any Russian aggression? The answers he has received apparently vary between ten million and sixty million dead; but since, as he drily comments, present assessments

of the damage which America would suffer in a nuclear war range between fifty and eighty million, her deterrent posture is not very credible. Civil defence measures—shelters, stock-piling, evacuation programmes, development of anti-radiation drugs—could reduce the estimated casualties to within the twenty million mark; and this, suggests Mr. Kahn, could mark the difference between a world in which the Russians might feel that they had an almost completely free hand, and one in which they should feel they had to act with some circumspection.

And together with these measures of passive defence should go active steps to increase the strength and invulnerability of American retaliatory forces, to give an "objective capacity" to fight, as well as to deter war. Without such a capacity those forces would lack credibility, even as a deterrent.

All this means heavy expenditure, now. Mr. Kahn assesses that the cost of preparations on this scale would involve an increase in the national budget of between ten and twenty per cent; but such an increase, points out Mr. Charles Hitch in *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, would be well within the capacity of an expanding American economy. It would be quite feasible now, he maintains, to increase expenditure on defence by thirty billion dollars a year. The incidental disadvantages

of such a course—inflation, direct controls, a higher level of taxation—disagreeable as they might appear, would not necessarily be incompatible with a booming economy. The real difficulty lies in the fact that war today must be waged with weapons and forces already in being. Shadow factories, stock-piling of raw materials and plans for industrial mobilization are as antiquated as the close blockade as weapons of economic warfare. The weapons-systems must be selected, produced and paid for long in advance; and it is in that selection—manned bomber versus missile, liquid-fuelled missiles versus solid fuelled, first-strike versus second-strike capacity, conventional versus nuclear forces—that the military intellectual comes in, with his tools of games theory and systems-analysis.

There is nothing particularly recon-dite about it. Such analysis, writes Mr. Hitch, is simply a

systematic effort to determine preferred courses of action. . . . More and better analysis may be useful in increasing efficiency in shaping many government programs and policies.

Moreover, as Mr. Kahn says,

there is a dearth of people with relevant practical experience in the conduct of thermonuclear wars. It will do no good to inveigh against theorists. In this field everyone is a theorist.

Like Cassio Mr. Kahn and his colleagues are mighty mathematicians who have never set a squadron in the field; but neither has anyone else in this new form of war where, if your mathematics are right and your squadron is sufficiently powerful, you may never need to set it in the field at all.

* * *

The analysts, then, are staff officers, clarifying the issues and exploring the implications of all the various courses of action open to the policy maker; and they must not be thought of, or allowed to pose, as anything else. Their skills do not qualify them to take either political or military decisions. For these other qualities are necessary: those of the man of the world who remains, as we have seen, the British ideal. Intellectual analysis, however painstaking, is rendered possible only by simplification of, and selection from, the infinite complexities of reality. There is more to every problem, military or political, than can ever be quantified and fed into a

tary strength. Pearl Harbour, he states,

is probably a little, but not very, pessimistic as a prediction of what the Russians actually will do if we allow a posture to develop which would tempt them.

There may, he admits, be "non-military restraints on their behaviour which may work, but it is hard to believe that these are reliable". Indeed, he considers that the belief that Russia and America have more to fear from fear itself than from each other can be possible only if one makes "some enormously optimistic assumptions" about Russia's ultimate willingness "to give up any hope of world domination to be achieved by the use of military force" (our italics).

It is quite possible to interpret the Marxist scriptures, or articles in Russian military periodicals, in such a way as to justify such a view, and the American Chiefs of Staff would be criminally foolish if they did not prepare for it as the worst possible case. Equally the Russian military leaders would be criminally foolish if they did not prepare for their worst possible case: either a surprise attack launched by the Western Imperialists on the Soviet motherland in a desperate attempt to halt the inevitable triumph of communism, or an irruption by a nuclear-armed Germany, backed by Wall-Street capitalists and Central-European counter-revolutionaries, to regain her lost lands. Nor would it be difficult for them to find, in Western military writings, plenty of passages suggesting that this is precisely what we have in mind.

What is absent from the thinking of most American military intellectuals—and it is a lack which spoils much even of their purely strategic thinking—is the slightest consideration of the possibility that Russian policy consists of a great deal more than Marxist doctrine plus Soviet economic potential; or that ideology may be only one factor among many in the shaping of Russian actions; or that Russia has at least as good historic grounds for fearing attack by the West as the West has for fearing attack by her. To state even these possibilities is again to oversimplify an infinitely complex world-picture by isolating certain arbitrarily chosen elements; but it is a simplification as logically tenable as that on which Mr. Kahn and his colleagues base

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE WEST
INDIES
FEDERATION

BERLIN
PIVOT OF GERMAN DESTINY
Edited and translated by

THE HISTORY
OF THE GREEK
AND ROMAN

EDERATION
ERSPECTIVES ON A NEW
ATION
DAVID LOWENTHAL
 Our essays give a comprehensive background to the West Indies today—The West Indies Emergent, Problems and Prospects', 'The Survival of the Past in the West Indies', 'The Political Development of the West Indies', and 'The Social Background of West Indian Federation'. 15s net
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM
 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA
D. V. COWEN
 An analysis of democratic government with particular reference to the problem of building a common society in South Africa. Though it is written from a South African standpoint and with South African problems particularly in mind, the author sees it also as a contribution to the understanding of democratic government and its benefit over totalitarianism. 30s net

THE JUDICIAL DECISION
 TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM
 The author considers three possible procedures of justification; precedent, equity, and a two-level procedure, which incorporates some of the features of the first two. Points of comparison between the problems of justification in the law and ethics are explored in detail. 30s net
 STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CHARLES B. ROBSON
Introduction by
WILLY BRANDT
Governing Mayor of Berlin
 Based on a series of lectures delivered at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University in Berlin, this book gathers together authoritative interpretations of all the major aspects of the Berlin situation. 40s net
 THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

THE SWINBURNE LETTERS
 VOLUME 3: 1875-1877
 VOLUME 4: 1877-1882
CECIL Y. LANG
 This edition, to be completed in six volumes, is the first to contain all of Swinburne's letters and many of those extant which are addressed to him. These two volumes show both the zenith and nadir of his energies in middle age. '... the splendid amassing of detail in these letters defines more and more the character of this extraordinary man and his vigorous critical instincts and passion for the best in literature.'
 William Plomer in the *Listener*
 84s net
 YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
G. V. DOXEY
 This important book traces the evolution of racial rigidities in the South African labour market, analyses the influences behind them, and describes their effect on industrial development. 22s 6d net

THEATRE
MARGARETE BIEBER
 The wealth of new material, mainly archaeological, makes this virtually a new book. In her comprehensive survey Dr Bieber presents and interprets the evidences of the theatre in the ancient world into a connected and systematic story, illuminated and enriched by the scholarship of a lifetime. Second edition, illustrated £5 5s net
 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMERICAN BUILDING ART
 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
CARL W. CONDIT
 This is the second of two volumes on the development of American building from Revolutionary times to the present. It emphasizes dams, suspension bridges, railway terminals, airports, motorways, tunnels, skyscrapers, etc., and the work of Frank Lloyd Wright and Mies van der Rohe. Illustrated £5 net

THE EUCHARIST & LITURGICAL RENEWAL
 ADDRESSES OF THE LITURGICAL CONFERENCE HELD IN SAINT PAUL'S CHURCH, SAN ANTONIO, NOVEMBER 16-18, 1959
Edited by MASSEY
 HAMILTON SHEPHERD, JR

These are lectures by well-known Anglican clergymen including Stephen F. Bayne, Jr., Alexander Schmemmann, and John Craine. The editor is the outstanding authority on liturgy in America. 21s net

can ever be quantified and fed into a computer, and every situation which confronts the statesman will be unforeseeably complicated and entirely unique.

The difference between the "models" and "scenarios" created by the analysts and real events is as great as that between an electronic computer and a fully developed human brain; and their attempts to analyse the political and strategic situation confronting their leaders, and the manner in which it is likely to develop, sometimes seem as hopeless and misleading as an attempt to translate Milton with a knowledge of a hundred words of the English language. This is no argument against trying: if a hundred words are all we know, we must do the best we can, and hope that gradually we may learn more. But it is an argument against the military intellectual adopting any attitude other than one of sceptical and self-doubting humility; and against responsible statesmen leaning on him too heavily for advice.

There is one field in particular where some American thinkers are guilty of a really dangerous degree of over-simplification. It is natural enough that they should, in their planning, work on a simple pattern in which the Soviet Union is the enemy, its intentions are equated with its capacities, and all other factors in the world situation are regarded as secondary compared with the direct confrontation between an implacably aggressive Russia and a virtuously defensive United States. Unless assumptions of this sort are made no military planning is possible at all. But it is arguable that even as an immensely simplified version of a highly complex situation this is not altogether valid; and many even among the most illustrious and sophisticated American military intellectuals seem to accept the picture not merely as simplified but as exact.

Mr. Kahn is among the more moderate in this respect, but Russia never figures in his book as anything but a simple, monolithic military power deterred from using armed force to conquer the world only by the maintenance of American mili-

as logically tenable as Mr. Kahn and his colleagues base their assumptions; and it would be cheering if, very occasionally, they realized that this was so.

At its worst, indeed, American thinking on the subject can be as fanatical, distorted and intellectually disreputable as that of the Marxists at their worst; and in a work such as *A Forward Strategy for America* one finds a strain of sustained ill-will, a one-sided attribution of motive and a begging of questions which have far more in common with the kind of propaganda it denounces than with any reputable thinking within the "Free World" which it seeks to uphold.

This work postulates an irrepressible and protracted conflict between "the West"—peace-loving, democratic, constitutional—and a monolithic communist block bent on world conquest, which can end only in the total victory of one side or the other. All the ills which have befallen the world during the past fifteen years are attributed solely to the Machiavellian planning of the communist conspirators.

The retreat-advance pattern of Soviet behaviour is illustrated by the Korean armistice, the Soviet backdown at Quemoy in 1958, and the end of the 1948-49 Berlin blockade on the one hand, and the aggressive Soviet penetration of the Middle East following the Geneva conference on the other.

In their own policy the American Government must not shrink from stern measures, and must be prepared, if need be, to "ignore public opinion, the cult of which has gone beyond the bounds of reason". There is, maintain the authors,

not one public opinion but two basic types, namely, the public opinion of those who want the United States to extend freedom and that of those who seem to care little if our opponents win.

By "extending freedom" the authors make it clear that they mean the liberation of eastern Europe; thus the overwhelming body of opinion, in America and elsewhere, which believes that the existing balance can and should be maintained is by implication labelled as fellow-travelling.

In an ideological struggle such as we are experiencing today this sort of polemic is inevitable. There is,

after all, plenty of it from the other side; and the picture here painted of the Soviet Union and its policy is perhaps no more grotesque—if little less—than that which Mr. Khrushchev paints of Mr. Kennedy as a puppet helpless in the grip of the Rockefeller interests of Wall Street. We are back in the seventeenth century, with Puritan preachers denouncing as traitors all who were lukewarm in their opposition to the onward march of Rome. How far such right-wing radicalism is politically important it would be impertinent for a foreigner to judge. But it is quite pertinent to point out that this work appears as an academic publication, the product of a body attached to a reputable university—the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania; and that, though as cold-war propaganda it may pass muster, its evident absence of disciplined intelligence, judicial fairness and historical sense imposes the duty on any reviewer to condemn

it as a flagrant instance of *trahison des clercs*.

Several of the authors and their collaborators have distinguished academic reputations; but it must be said that there is in this work little evidence that any single one of them has disciplined his mind and judgment by any scholarly study of history, international relations or political thought. To take only one example. There is no doubt that the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1956 was a flagrant and unforgivable outrage, which the world should not quickly forget. But to describe it, in a work of serious political analysis, as "the most blatant, ruthless example of imperialism in the twentieth century" is to display either a very limited acquaintance with twentieth-century history, or a very peculiar criterion of judgment indeed.

In general, to contrast "the Free World" as one would ideally wish it to be (but as, regrettably, it quite certainly is not) with a communist world painted as black and

evil as selective quotation can make it, may be skilful advocacy; but to do so is to lay oneself open to an accusation of intellectual dishonesty, besides spoiling a case which has no need of defence by such methods. At times one seriously wonders whether the authors have any real comprehension of those western values—Greek moderation, Christian charity, Roman respect for the rule of law, the purifying scepticism of the Enlightenment—which they claim so staunchly to defend.

It is necessary to speak bluntly about this; for although the activities of the group responsible for this book are far from representative of the military analysts in general, their thinking embodies in pure form a spirit which exists very generally in dilution. This consists in a willingness to approach every problem with an open mind and examine each with all the rigorous tools of analysis furnished by the social and natural sciences, excepting only the *fons et origo* of all problems: the cold war

itself, the multiple factors in Russian policy, the significance, in a changing world, of the traditional communist threat to the West. These points are taken for granted as a basis on which the whole vast edifice of military deterrence has been raised.

But should intellectuals, military or civil, take anything for granted? Some of them at least should be asking some sceptical and awkward questions about the complex relationship of ideology to political leadership, or be wondering whether, in any historical confrontation of major powers, the issues have ever been quite so simple as we are told they are today. Russian society may in our eyes be drab and perverted, but the assumption that it is composed basically of a deluded or terrorized mass of automata led by a group of power-hungry fanatics is a dubious one on which to found a strategic or diplomatic policy. The intellectuals may have to accept the military as their masters; but they have the duty to educate, as well as to serve them.

THE DILEMMAS OF POWER

GEORGE F. KENNAN: *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*. 411pp. Hutchinson. 40s.

Mr. Kennan occupies a unique position as an American scholar-diplomatist. He has filled the highest posts in the diplomatic service of his country, including that of ambassador in Moscow; and he is at the present moment United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He is writing—and has still to complete—a detailed multi-volume history of American-Russian relations in the years immediately after the revolution, in which he grapples with the vexed problem of the motives and consequences of intervention. Though he has never held a regular teaching post, his lectures at Oxford and at Harvard have attracted large student audiences: these lectures form the core of his latest book. Mr. Kennan is a fluent and attractive writer as well as lecturer: much of the present volume has the ready flow of the spoken word, and can be read with the minimum of effort.

Among Mr. Kennan's virtues is modesty; and he must have been embarrassed by some of the well-

the summit of wisdom in the camp of the Allies in the First World War: if only the Allies had then embraced the idea of a compromise peace, how many disasters might have been avoided. But we have to wait only a few pages for the crushing verdict of Mr. Kennan the hard-headed diplomatist, delivered in another but similar context—that of the Prinkip proposal for a compromise peace between Bolsheviks and Russian "Whites":

The proposal was a naive one. What the Bolsheviks and their Russian opponents were interested in was each other's total destruction. There was no room here for amicable discussion. Since the document stemmed from Wilson's pen, it would be easy to assume—and some have done so—that it was only another reflection of the naive American conviction that man is a reasonable animal, dominated by good will.

But it would be a grave error to write off the idealist and prophet in Mr. Kennan for the benefit of the diplomatist and the cynic. Much of Mr. Kennan's insight springs from

writes is not always free from at any rate the appearance of self-contradiction. The test question is, of course, so-called Soviet "aggression". What Stalin really wanted in the final stages of the war, says Mr. Kennan, was "the expulsion of American influence from the Eurasian land mass generally and its replacement by that of his own regime". This seems incorrect in two respects. In the first place, what Stalin wanted mainly at this time was surely a cut-and-dried division of Europe between two spheres of influence: all the evidence goes to show that he was willing to leave the West alone in its sphere, provided the West was ready to give him a free hand in his sphere (especially in Poland, Rumania and Hungary). Secondly, it was not American but western European influence which Stalin regarded with a jaundiced eye; when the war ended, Stalin's attitude towards the United States was still relatively friendly, as is shown by

his refusal to have the seat of the United Nations in western Europe and his readiness to accept a Trans-Atlantic location.

But the misleading element in this statement is partly redeemed by a later passage in which Mr. Kennan argues strongly that the Soviet regime has never sought to advance its cause primarily by military means or by what he calls "the normal devices of war". The challenge put up by Soviet Russia throughout the world has been the challenge of revolution, and "the responses to it have always had to lie partly in the field of domestic policy".

Here Mr. Kennan leaves us. To prescribe or discuss these requisite responses would have led him far into the domain of social and economic policy which, not unnaturally, he has treated as outside his province. What he has said and what he leaves unsaid add up to a tantalizingly imperfect, baffling, yet always stimulating, book.



CAMBRIDGE BOOKS

W. B. Yeats: His Poetry and Thought

A. G. STOCK

A critical interpretation of Yeats's poetry which considers three elements in particular: preoccupation with the Irish tradition, social and political outlook, and the ideas formulated in *A Vision*. Professor Stock pays considerable attention to Yeats's borrowing from eastern thought. 27s. 6d. net

Rilke, Europe and the English-Speaking World

E. C. MASON

A detailed examination of Rilke's attitude to his own nationality, to the idea of a European cultural heritage, and the place in it of the English-speaking countries, showing how these considerations affected his poetry. 30s. net

Wyclif and the Oxford Schools

J. A. ROBSON

As full an account as the records permit of Wyclif's career as an Oxford don. The book is also a study in scholastic philosophy and theology, and throws new light on